Natural Kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight by Ian Hacking.

Basically and simply: there are no such things as “natural kinds.” Despite the fact that the concept has an endowed history and has functioned well for certain conceptual purposes (eg. as a mode of clear-cut classifying such as is required by the scholastic tradition), the concept is so theoretically saturated by varieties that it is now impotent.

The concept of natural kinds has not denigrated simply because continued research has grown the theory exponentially causing the plethora of strains to overshadow the original seeded theory and thus requiring a higher level theoretical noose. Rather, according to Hacking, the concept of natural kinds has within its essence a self-destructing thread.

Somehow, the hierarchical structuring of natural kinds (species, genera. families, orders) requires an “artifical” construction of grouping practices which precludes the possibility of natural kinds being natural in the first place.  In this paper there is no reasoning as to why, when something is constructed, it is then not natural. This natural category is always problematic.

“Kinds” then are those entities which can be grouped into some set with a specific name. Thus, natural kinds is a a nomilistic convention.

The Origins of ‘Natural Kinds’: Keeping ‘Essentialism” at Bay in the Age of Reform

Gordon McOuat

Intellectual History Review 19(2) 2009: 211-230

Essentialism-here refers to the idea that for any specific thing there is some absolutely necessary element(s) present thus allowing for a percise definition.

Natural Kinds-groups of entities that share a set of necessary and sufficient properties and exist in some real sense as a unified class. The classic example of a natural kind is the “electron” in physics.

This paper argues that contrary to standard historical perspectives on the historical relationship between essentialism and natural kinds–namely that essentialism is the seeded form of natural kinds leading to the classification of species as a natural kind–they are in fact counter-weighted such that the development of the concept of natural kinds coincided with a strategic decline of the concept of essentialism.

So how did this work?

Essentialism is criticized by philosophers of science as the scientific objective of discovering essences then developing percise definitions. While such may in fact be the objective, the actual practices of scientists (specifically of naturalists in the Darwinian era as is the focus of this paper) does not reflect this goal. Rather, naturalists sought to avoid the rigidity of essentialist ideology because it was divisive, limiting, and counter productive. Hence the rise of the concept of natural kinds.

Natural kinds–the grouping of entities according to an apparent shared set of commonalities shifts the onus of classification onto the beholder ( and away from the concept of something being firm, absolute and separate). This  allows the observer to draw on on “convention, tradition, and intuitive knowledge” (220).  Without the strict adherence to definition and logic as in the ideology of essentialism, the door is then open to allow for dynamism and fluidity in characterizing the natural world–thought by many to be a more accurate representation.

The problem that arose is that the understanding of natural kinds–species–becomes subject to the experts or those who know and hence becomes somewhat of a closed and protected system. Challenges to the system–which becomes important insofar as ideology within the natural sciences is connected to broader social-organizing practices and ideology–is very difficult.

This paper concludes by defining natural kinds as a type of boundary object that although is not strictly defined, is familiar enough to fit in a various contexts. It is fluid enough to accommodate a variety of concepts and firm enough to create coherence among diversity.

Questions:

1. The author suggests that this issue is fueled by religion. Yet religious traditions at that time and place held humans as a species above the natural world at least to the extent that humans are spiritual and intellectual–so why did the philosophers/scientists of the day turn to the natural sciences to ground social and political thought?

2. If, as the author suggests, there have never really been any true essentialism, why do so many people believe there was and why did/does it have such an influence–much literature on the issue. On what is this debate founded?

3. Why do we look for absolutes? Clear definitions? Why this incessant need to know? Why not accept uncertainty?

4. Want to know more about boundary objects. How do they work? Evaluation criteria?

Anthropomorphism, primatomorphism,

mammalomorphism: understanding

cross-species comparisons

BRIAN L. KEELEY

Biology and Philosophy 19: 521–540, 2004.

In this article, the author argues that the “sin” of anthropomorphism is rooted in an outdated theological tradition that equated describing God in terms of human qualities to a blasphemous act that reduced God to mere mortal and elided his “beyond our ability to know” status. The author suggests that the severity of this charge underpins present resistance to anthropomorphism.

The author is concerned with cognitive ethology which is the study of animal behavior that uses the tools and methods of cognitive science. In such a practice, studies of animal behavior draw on such concepts as “play,” “rape,” or “mindreading” as part of an investigative framework. The charge from antianthropormophites is that the attribution of such “human” qualities is inappropriate and imposes a human perspective on the non-human world thus masking a true understanding of what is “really” happening.

The author more specifically argues that the fallacy of anthropomorphism is a myth because it is not a problem in principle and in fact it is reasonable to consider that other animals may share some forms of cognitive capacities with humans given the shared evolutionary history. What is important, however, is that anthropomorphism not be offered as intuitive anecdotal explanatory evidence but rather be investigated by means of testable hypothesis and empirical evidence.

Dawkins, Richard. “Universal Darwinism.” Philosophy of Biology eds. Hull & Ruse, London: Oxford, 1998

Basic point of this paper is to argue that darwinism is approximately a universal maxim. In other words, it will work well anywhere. Dawkins reviews seven different evolution theories, points out their strengths and weaknesses in order to show that indeed darwinism is the best.

Defining complexity

“Complexity is a statistical concept…A complex thing is a statistically improbable thing, something with a very low a priori likelihood of coming into being” (16).

“Living things are not just statistically improbably in the trivial sense of hindsight: theory statistical improbability is limited by the a priori constraints of design. They are adaptively complex” (17).

Certainly there is some problem with this definition. The problem for me comes with the comparison of human artifacts with living entities. What I mean to say is that complexity should be a statement of how a thing comes into being as much as a statement of the current organization. Earlier in this essay, Dawkins refers to Paley’s watch argument. That argument goes something like this: “if you find a watch on the beach, the complexity of if demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that it was designed by and intelligent agent.” Though a living entity may be as structurally complex as a watch, it is the way in which it is formed that makes it “adaptive.” A watch is not adaptive, it cannot change itself. A living entity grows. It develops from a bottom-up process whereas a watch is constructed from a top-down process. Stark contrast here.

Theory 1: Vitalism. Living entities have within them a drive which motivates them toward progressive goodness or perfection. This idea is disregarded with little fanfare. Dawkins says that this theory does not explain anything.

It’s kind of a shame that he dismisses this theory so quickly. Not that I think it holds much water, it is just that this notion is so pervasive in culture, language etc that it deserves a bit more attention.

Theory 2: Lamarcksim. This is the theory that giraffes got long necks by trying to eat the leaves on high trees. It somehow stretches and this stretched neck is passed on to the next generation. This theory is sometimes referred to as the use/disuse theory.

Problem:

1. Only works in some cases, such as muscles and not others (giraffe’s neck).

2. Changes are not always an improvement (if a parent is injured, this theory would suggest that the injury would be passed on).

3. Doesn’t explain why beneficial traits culminate, natural selection is still necessary

“The Lamarckian theory, on the other hand, relies on a much cruder coupling: the rule that the more an animal uses a certain bit of itself, the bigger that bit ought to be. The rule occasionally might have some validity, but not generally, and as a sculptor of adaptation, it is a blunt hatche in comparison to the fine chisel of natural selection” (19)

“If you have a complex and reasonably well-adapted system, the number of things you can do to it that will make it perform less well is vastly greater than the number of things you can do to it that will improve it” (20).

I seem to think that Dawkins has much too rosy a picture of natural selection. On the one hand, he explains it in terms of a chisel and on the other hand portrays it as being so fragile. Well I guess this is a consistent metaphor, but to me, that ns produces such vulnerable entities is a mark against it, not for it.

Theory 3: Environmental Imprint. This is to say that organisms take on the shape, color, or whatever directly from their habitat. The example is a frog that has the same coloration of the long grass in which it lives.

Problems:

1. the environmental info must get into genetic form in order to be passed on, this theory does not account for this.

2. How does the organism get rid of problematic traits.

3. Can only work if embryology is perforministic (not sure what this means, something to do with reversibility)

Theory 4: Saltationism. A sudden appearance of a fully formed complex entity.

Problems:

1. Too much like magic

2. Doesn’t actually explain how it came to be

3. Confuses with punctuated equilibrium

4. Confuses 747 and dc8 (there can be big changes is magnitude but not in major information)

“whenever in the universe adaptive complexity shall be found, it will have come into being gradually through a series of small alteration, never through large and sudden increments in adaptive complexity” (24).

I disagree with this and partly because I find there to be a problem with the definition of “adaptive complexity.” I do not think that there is such thing as magic or anything other than what is in the natural world; however, certainly, theories such as complexity and dynamic systems theory have shown that at certain tipping points, major newness, novelty, levels of complexity, or whatever you want to call it appear. This of course is not the same as a 747 appearing in from the junkyard, but nonetheless, it might count as a saltation of sorts. At least it might look like a saltation. I think that if emergence was considered and explained appropriately, it would actually strengthen Dawkins arguments against magical saltation.

Theory 5: Random Evolution. This is the notion that mutation is the true evolutionary force and selection merely weeds out the bad apples, so to speak.

Problems:

1. Contradicts most of the evidence of natural selection so far.

2. Mutations have to be directed to account for any degree of adaptability thus far.

Theory 6: Direction (order) imposed on Random Variation by Natural Selection. Darwinism. Works every time, and probably everywhere (says Dawkins). It contains replicators (genes), phenotypic controls, causal process, and cumulative selection gets adaptive complexity.

“Darwin’s theory is falsifiable, but he was much too wise to make his theory that easy to falsify!” (29).

I wonder what type of information could falsify Darwinism?

Sober, Elliot and David Sloan Wilson. “A Critical Review of Philosophical Work on the Units of Selection Problem.” Philosophy of Science, 62:4 (1994), p. 534-55.

As the title suggests, this article reviews the debate over the level of selection in the evolutionary process. More specifically, it reviews the specific questions of evolutionary altruism—a phenomenon in which an organism sacrifices its own individual fitness for the sake of the group. Darwin formulated a type of groups or population selection, which is sometimes countered by notions of individual selection. Dawkins suggests a type of genetic selection which gets expressed in the fitness of phenotypes. The central question seems to revolve around the prominence of genes. Selection clearly favours organisms, groups and/or genes. Yet at times, evolutionary altruism is apparent in individuals and groups, but is that evident in genes? Would genes sacrifice themselves for the group of genes, would not that be going against a key functional constant of genes? These are just a few of the topics discussed.

Pg 536 “Dawkins distinguished replicator and vehicles. Genes are examples of the former and organisms are examples of the latter.” This vaguely resembles the mind/body dualism.